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Abstract. Increasingly, a huge amount of statistics have been gathered which clearly indicates that income
and wealth distributions in various countries or societies follow a robust pattern, close to the Gibbs dis-
tribution of energy in an ideal gas in equilibrium. However, it also deviates in the low income and more
significantly for the high income ranges. Application of physics models provides illuminating ideas and
understanding, complementing the observations.
PACS. 8 9.20.Hh,89.75.Hc,89.75.Da,43.38.Si
1 Introduction
In any society or country, if one can isolate its count on
people and their money or wealth, one finds that while
the total money or wealth remains fairly constant on a
relatively longer time scale, its movement from individual
to individual is not so due to its dynamics at shorter time
scales (daily or weekly). Eventually, on overall average for
the society or country, there appears very robust money
or wealth distributions. Empirical data for society show a
small variation in the value of the power-law exponent that
characterises the ‘tail’ of the distribution, while it equals
to unity for firms. Locally, of course, there appear many
‘obvious reasons’ for such uneven distribution of wealth
or income within the societies. However, such ‘reasons’
seem to be very ineffective if the global robust structure
of the income and wealth distribution in various societies
is considered. Statistical physics based models for such
distributions seem to succeed in capturing the essential
‘reasons’ for such universal aspects of the distributions.
Here, we review the empirical basis for considering ki-
netic exchange models for income and wealth distributions
in Sec. 2. We then discuss the gas like models in Sec. 3
and give the details of their numerical analyses in Sec. 4,
while in Sec. 5 we review the analytical studies done so
far on these models. Sec. 6 discusses other model studies,
including an annealed savings model and a model with a
non-consumable commodity. Finally, we end with discus-
sions in Sec. 7.
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2 Empirical studies of income and wealth
distributions
The distribution of wealth among individuals in an econ-
omy has been an important area of research in economics,
for more than a hundred years [1,2,3,4]. The same is true
for income distribution in any society. Detailed analysis of
the income distribution [3,4] so far indicate
P (m) ∼
{
mα exp(−m/T ) for m < mc,
m−(1+ν) for m ≥ mc, (1)
where P denotes the number density of people with in-
come or wealth m and α, ν denote exponents and T de-
notes a scaling factor. The power law in income and wealth
distribution (for m ≥ mc) is named after Pareto and the
exponent ν is called the Pareto exponent. A historical ac-
count of Pareto’s data and that from recent sources can
be found in Ref. [5]. The crossover point (mc) is extracted
from the crossover from the Gamma distribution form to
the power law tail. One often fits the region below mc to
a log-normal form logP (m) ∝ −(logm)2. Although this
form is often preferred by economists, we think that the
other Gamma distribution form Eqn. (1) fits better with
the data, because of the remarkable fit with the Gibbs
distribution in Ref. [6]. We consider that in the following
discussion. This robust feature of P (m) seems to be very
well established for the analysis of the enormous amount
of data available today (See Fig. 1). We consider this dis-
tribution (in view of its stability and universality) to be
an ‘equilibrium’ (in the thermodynamic sense) distribu-
tion in a many-body (interacting, statistical) system like a
gas, where the Gibbs distribution are established for more
than 100 years. This paper reviews the various attempts
in this direction.
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Fig. 1. (a) Distribution P (m) of individual weekly income in UK for 1992, 1997 and 2002; data adapted from Ref. [7]. (b)
Distribution P (m) of individual weekly income for manufacturing and service sectors in USA for 1992; data for US Statistical
survey, taken from Ref. [7]. The inset shows the probability distribution of individual annual income, from US census data of
1996. The data is adapted from Ref. [8]. (c) Cumulative probability Q(m) =
∫
∞
m
P (m)dm of rescaled adjusted gross personal
annual income in US for IRS data from 2001 (adapted from Ref [6]), with Pareto exponent ν ≈ 1.5 (given by the slope of the
solid line). (d) Cumulative probability distribution of Japanese personal income in the year 2000 (data adapted from Ref. [9]).
The power law (Pareto) region approximately fits to ν = 1.96.
Although Pareto [1] and Gini [10] had respectively
identified the power-law tail and the log-normal bulk of
the income distribution, the demonstration of both fea-
tures in the same distribution was possibly first demon-
strated by Montroll and Shlesinger [11] through an anal-
ysis of fine-scale income data obtained from the US In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) for the year 1935-36. It was
observed that while the top 2-3 % of the population (in
terms of income) followed a power law with Pareto expo-
nent ν ≃ 1.63; the rest followed a lognormal distribution.
Later work on Japanese personal income data based on
detailed records obtained from the Japanese National Tax
Administration indicated that the tail of the distribution
followed a power law value that fluctuated from year to
year around the mean value of 2 [12]. Further work [13]
showed that the power law region described the top 10%
or less of the population (in terms of income), while the re-
maining income distribution was well-described by the log-
normal form. While the value fluctuated significantly from
year to year, it was observed that the parameter describ-
ing the log-normal bulk, the Gibrat index [14], remained
relatively unchanged. The change of income from year to
year, i.e., the growth rate as measured by the log ratio of
the income tax paid in successive years, was observed by
Fujiwara et al [15] to be also a heavy tailed distribution,
although skewed, and centered about zero. Later work on
the US income distribution based on data from IRS for
the years 1997-1998, while still indicating a power-law tail
(with ν ≃ 1.7), have suggested that the the lower 95%
of the population have income whose distribution may be
better described by an exponential form [8,16]. The same
observation has been made for income distribution in the
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UK for the years 1994-1999, where the value was found
to vary between 2.0 and 2.3, but the bulk seemed to be
well-described by an exponential decay.
It is interesting to note that, when one shifts attention
from the income of individuals to the income of compa-
nies, one still observes the power law tail. A study of the
income distribution of Japanese firms [17] concluded that
it follows a power law with ν ≃ 1, which is also often re-
ferred to as the Zipf’s law. Similar observation has been
reported for the income distribution of US companies [18].
Compared to the empirical work done on income dis-
tribution, relatively few studies have looked at the dis-
tribution of wealth, which consist of the net value of as-
sets (financial holdings and/or tangible items) owned at a
given point in time. The lack of an easily available data
source for measuring wealth, analogous to income tax re-
turns for measuring income, means that one has to resort
to indirect methods. Levy and Solomon [19] used a pub-
lished list of wealthiest people to generate a rank-order
distribution, from which they inferred the Pareto expo-
nent for wealth distribution in USA. Refs. [16] and [20]
used an alternative technique based on adjusted data re-
ported for the purpose of inheritance tax to obtain the
Pareto exponent for UK. Another study used tangible as-
set (namely house area) as a measure of wealth to obtain
the wealth distribution exponent in ancient Egyptian soci-
ety during the reign of Akhenaten (14th century BC) [21].
The wealth distribution in Hungarian medieval society has
also been seen to follow a Pareto law [22]. More recently,
the wealth distribution in India at present was also ob-
served to follow a power law tail with the exponent vary-
ing around 0.9 [23]. The general feature observed in the
limited empirical study of wealth distribution is that of
a power law behavior for the wealthiest 5 − 10% of the
population, and exponential or log-normal distribution for
the rest of the population. The Pareto exponent as mea-
sured from the wealth distribution is found to be always
lower than the exponent for the income distribution, which
is consistent with the general observation that, in mar-
ket economies, wealth is much more unequally distributed
than income [24].
The striking regularities (see Fig. 1) observed in the
income distribution for different countries, have led to
several new attempts at explaining them on theoretical
grounds. Much of the current impetus is from physicists’
modelling of economic behavior in analogy with large sys-
tems of interacting particles, as treated, e.g., in the kinetic
theory of gases. According to physicists working on this
problem, the regular patterns observed in the income (and
wealth) distribution may be indicative of a natural law for
the statistical properties of a many-body dynamical sys-
tem representing the entire set of economic interactions in
a society, analogous to those previously derived for gases
and liquids. By viewing the economy as a thermodynamic
system, one can identify the income distribution with the
distribution of energy among the particles in a gas. In
particular, a class of kinetic exchange models have pro-
vided a simple mechanism for understanding the unequal
accumulation of assets. Many of these models, while sim-
ple from the perspective of economics, has the benefit of
coming to grips with the key factor in socioeconomic inter-
actions that results in very different societies converging
to similar forms of unequal distribution of resources (see
Refs. [3,4], which consists of a collection of large number
of technical papers in this field; see also [25,26,27,28,29,30]
for some popular discussions and criticisms as well as ap-
preciations).
Considerable investigations with real data during the
last ten years revealed that the tail of the income distri-
bution indeed follows the above mentioned behavior and
the value of the Pareto exponent ν is generally seen to
vary between 1 and 3 [16,19,23,31,32,33,34,35,36]. It is also
known that typically less than 10% of the population in
any country possesses about 40% of the total wealth of
that country and they follow the above law. The rest of
the low income population, follow a different distribution
which is debated to be either Gibbs [16,19,32,37,38,39] or
log-normal [33,34,35].
3 Gas-like models
In 1960, Mandelbrot wrote “There is a great temptation
to consider the exchanges of money which occur in eco-
nomic interaction as analogous to the exchanges of energy
which occur in physical shocks between molecules. In the
loosest possible terms, both kinds of interactions should
lead to similar states of equilibrium. That is, one should
be able to explain the law of income distribution by a
model similar to that used in statistical thermodynamics:
many authors have done so explicitly, and all the others
of whom we know have done so implicitly.” [2]. However,
Mandelbrot does not provide any references to this bulk
of material! Here, we discuss the recent literature and the
developments.
In analogy to two-particle collisions with a resulting
change in their individual kinetic energy (or momenta),
income exchange models may be based on two-agent in-
teractions. Here two randomly selected agents exchange
money by some pre-defined mechanism. Assuming the ex-
change process does not depend on previous exchanges,
the dynamics follows a Markovian process:(
mi(t+ 1)
mj(t+ 1)
)
=M
(
mi(t)
mj(t)
)
(2)
where mi(t) is the income of agent i at time t and the
collision matrix M defines the exchange mechanism.
In this class of models, one considers a closed economic
system where total money M and total number of agents
N is fixed. This corresponds to a situation where no pro-
duction or migration occurs and the only economic activ-
ity is confined to trading. Each agent i, individual or cor-
porate, posesses money mi(t) at time t. In any trading, a
pair of traders i and j exchange their money [37,38,39,40],
such that their total money is (locally) conserved (Fig. 2)
and none end up with negative money (mi(t) ≥ 0, i.e,
debt not allowed):
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) +∆m; mj(t+ 1) = mj(t)−∆m (3)
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the trading process. Agents i and
j redistribute their money in the market:mi(t) andmj(t), their
respective money before trading, changes over to mi(t+1) and
mj(t+ 1) after trading.
following local conservation:
mi(t) +mj(t) = mi(t+ 1) +mj(t+ 1); (4)
time (t) changes by one unit after each trading.
3.1 Model A: Without any savings
The simplest model considers a random fraction of total
money to be shared [39]:
∆m = ǫij [mi(t) +mj(t)]−mi(t), (5)
where ǫij is a random fraction ( 0 ≤ ǫij ≤ 1) changing with
time or trading. The steady-state (t→∞) distribution of
money is Gibbs one:
P (m) = (1/T ) exp(−m/T );T =M/N. (6)
Hence, no matter how uniform or justified the initial dis-
tribution is, the eventual steady state correspond to Gibbs
a distribution where most of the people have got very lit-
tle money. This follows from the conservation of money
and additivity of entropy:
P (m1)P (m2) = P (m1 +m2). (7)
This steady state result is quite robust and realistic too! In
fact, several variations of the trading, and of the ‘lattice’
(on which the agents can be put and each agent trade with
its ‘lattice neighbors’ only), whether compact, fractal or
small-world like [31], leaves the distribution unchanged.
Some other variations like random sharing of an amount
2m2 only (not of m1 + m2) when m1 > m2 (trading at
the level of lower economic class in the trade), lead even
to a drastic situation: all the money in the market drifts
to one agent and the rest become truely pauper [41,25].
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Fig. 3. Steady state money distribution P (m) for the model
with uniform savings. The data shown are for different values
of λ: 0, 0.1, 0.6, 0.9 for a system size N = 100. All data sets
shown are for average money per agent M/N = 1.
3.2 Model B: With uniform savings
In any trading, savings come naturally [24]. A saving propen-
sity factor λ was therefore introduced in the random ex-
change model [40] (see [39] for model without savings),
where each trader at time t saves a fraction λ of its money
mi(t) and trades randomly with the rest:
mi(t+ 1) = λmi(t) + ǫij [(1 − λ)(mi(t) +mj(t))] , (8)
mj(t+ 1) = λmj(t) + (1− ǫij) [(1 − λ)(mi(t) +mj(t))] ,
(9)
where
∆m = (1 − λ)[ǫij{mi(t) +mj(t)} −mi(t)], (10)
ǫij being a random fraction, coming from the stochastic
nature of the trading.
The market (non-interacting at λ = 0 and 1) becomes
‘interacting’ for any non-vanishing λ(< 1): For fixed λ
(same for all agents), the steady state distribution P (m)
of money is exponentially decaying on both sides with the
most-probable money per agent shifting away from m = 0
(for λ = 0) toM/N as λ→ 1 (Fig. 3). This self-organizing
feature of the market, induced by sheer self-interest of sav-
ing by each agent without any global perspective, is quite
significant as the fraction of paupers decrease with saving
fraction λ and most people end up with some finite frac-
tion of the average money in the market (for λ → 1, the
socialists’ dream is achieved with just people’s self-interest
of saving!). Interestingly, self-organisation also occurs in
such market models when there is restriction in the com-
modity market [42]. Although this fixed saving propensity
does not give yet the Pareto-like power-law distribution,
the Markovian nature of the scattering or trading pro-
cesses (Eqn. (7)) is effectively lost. Indirectly through λ,
the agents get to know (start interacting with) each other
and the system co-operatively self-organises towards a sta-
ble form with a non-vanishing most-probable income (see
Fig. 3).
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Patriarca et al [43] claimed through heuristic argu-
ments (based on numerical results) that the distribution
is a close approximate form of the Gamma distribution
P (m) = Cmα exp[−m/T ] (11)
where T = 1/(α + 1) and C = (α + 1)α+1/Γ (α + 1), Γ
being the Gamma function whose argument α is related
to the savings factor λ as:
α =
3λ
1− λ. (12)
When compared with Eqn. (6) for λ = 0 limit, it is to
be noted that M/N = 1 here. Also, when compared with
Eqn. (1), mc → ∞. the qualitative argument forwarded
here [43] is that, as λ increases, effectively the agents (par-
ticles) retain more of its money (energy) in any trading
(scattering). This can be taken as implying that with in-
creasing λ, the effective dimensionality increases and tem-
perature of the scattering process changes [43].
This result has also been supported by numerical re-
sults in Ref. [44]. However, a later study [45,46] analyzed
the moments, and found that moments upto the third
order agree with those obtained from the form of the
Eqn. (12), and discrepancies start from fourth order on-
wards. Hence, the actual form of the distribution for this
model still remains to be found out.
It seems that a very similar model was proposed by
Angle [47,48,49] several years back in sociology journals.
Angle’s ‘One Parameter Inequality Process’ model is de-
scribed by the equations:
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) +Dtwmj(t)− (1−Dt)wmi(t)
mj(t+ 1) = mj(t) + (1−Dt)wmi(t)−Dtwmj(t)
(13)
where w is a fixed fraction and Dt takes value 0 or 1 ran-
domly. The numerical simulation results of Angle’s model
fit well to Gamma distributions.
In the gas like models with uniform savings, the distri-
bution of wealth shows a self organizing feature. A peaked
distribution with a most-probable value indicates an eco-
nomic scale. Empirical observations in homogeneous groups
of individuals as in waged income of factory labourers in
UK and USA [7] and data from population survey in USA
among students of different school and colleges produce
similar distributions [49]. This is a simple case where a
homogeneous population (say, characterised by a unique
value of λ) has been identified.
3.3 Model C: With distributed savings
In a real society or economy, the interest of saving varies
from person to person, which implies that λ is a very inho-
mogeneous parameter. To imitate this situation, we move
a step closer to the real situation where saving factor λ is
widely distributed within the population [50,51,52]. The
evolution of money in such a trading can be written as:
mi(t+1) = λimi(t)+ ǫij [(1− λi)mi(t) + (1− λj)mj(t)] ,
(14)
Fig. 4. Steady state money distribution P (m) for the dis-
tributed λ model with 0 ≤ λ < 1 for a system of N = 1000
agents. The x−2 is a guide to the observed power-law, with
1 + ν = 2. Here, the average money per agent M/N = 1.
mj(t+1) = λjmj(t)+(1−ǫij) [(1− λi)mi(t) + (1− λj)mj(t)]
(15)
The trading rules are same as before, except that
∆m = ǫij(1− λj)mj(t)− (1 − λi)(1− ǫij)mi(t) (16)
here; where λi and λj are the saving propensities of agents
i and j. The agents have fixed (over time) saving propen-
sities, distributed independently, randomly and uniformly
(white) within an interval 0 to 1: agent i saves a random
fraction λi (0 ≤ λi < 1) and this λi value is quenched for
each agent (λi are independent of trading or t). Studies
show that for uniformly distributed saving propensities,
ρ(λ) = 1 for 0 ≤ λ < 1, one gets eventually P (m) ∼
m(1+ν), with ν = 1 (see Fig. 4). The eventual deviation
from the power law in Q(m) in the inset of Fig. 4 is due
to the exponential cutoff contributed by the rare statistics
for high m value.
4 Numerical analysis of models A, B and C
Starting with an arbitrary initial (uniform or random) dis-
tribution of money among the agents, the market evolves
with the trading. At each time, two agents are randomly
selected and the money exchange among them occurs, fol-
lowing the above mentioned scheme. We check for the
steady state, by looking at the stability of the money dis-
tribution in successive Monte Carlo steps t (we define one
Monte Carlo time step as N pairwise exchanges). Eventu-
ally, after a typical relaxation time the money distribution
becomes stationary. This relaxation time is dependent on
system size N and the distribution of λ (e.g, ∼ 106 for
N = 1000 and uniformly distributed λ). After this, we
average the money distribution over ∼ 103 time steps. Fi-
nally we take configurational average over ∼ 105 realiza-
tions of the λ distribution to get the money distribution
P (m). It is found to follow a power law for the wealth-
iest population (∼ 10%). This decay fits to Pareto law
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Fig. 5. Steady state money distribution P (m) for a model
with f = 0.6 fraction of agents with a uniform saving propen-
sity λ1 = 0.6 and the rest 1 − f fraction having random uni-
formly distributed (quenched) savings, in 0 ≤ λ < 1 for a
system of N = 200 agents. Here, the average money per agent
M/N = 1. The top inset shows P (m) in log-log scale for the
full range, while the bottom inset shows the cumulative distri-
bution Q(m). In addition to the power law tail in P (m) and
Q(m) (as in the basic, distributed savings model), Q(m) re-
sembles a behavior similar to observed in empirical data (see
Fig. 1).
Eqn. (1) with ν ≃ 1 (Fig. 4). We also checked that for
a mixed population where a fraction f has fixed saving
propensity λ = λ1 and for the rest (1 − f fraction), λ is
distributed uniformly within 0 ≤ λ < 1, we find a money
distribution resembling very much the observed empirical
distributions (see Fig. 5), as shown in Fig. 1. Here, when
P (m) is fitted in Eqn. (1), we have ν = 1 and the exponent
α is approximately given by Eqn. (12) with λ = λ1 and
mc depending on f and λ1. Note, for finite size N of the
market, the distribution has a narrow initial growth upto
a most-probable value mp after which it falls off with a
power-law tail for several decades. This Pareto law (with
ν ≃ 1) covers the entire range in m of the distribution
P (m) in the limit N → ∞. We checked that this power
law is extremely robust: apart from the uniform λ distri-
bution used in the simulations in Fig. 4, we also checked
the results for a distribution
ρ(λ) ∼ |λ0 − λ|δ, λ0 6= 1, 0 < λ < 1, (17)
of quenched λ values among the agents. The Pareto law
with ν = 1 is universal for all δ. The data in Fig. 4 corre-
sponds to λ0 = 0, δ = 0. For negative δ values, however,
we get an initial (small m) Gibbs-like decay in P (m) (see
Fig. 6. Steady state money distribution P (m) in the model for
N = 200 agents with λ distributed as ρ(λ) ∼ λδ with different
values of δ. A guide to the power law with exponent 1 + ν = 2
is also provided. For all cases, the average money per agent
M/N = 1.
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Fig. 7. Steady state money distribution P (m) in the model
for N = 200 agents with λ distributed as ρ(λ) ∼ |1− λ|δ with
different values of δ. The distributions P (m) have power law
tails P (m) ∼ m−(1+ν), where the power law exponents 1 + ν
approximately equal to 2 + δ indicated by the dotted straight
lines. For all cases, the average money per agent M/N = 1.
Fig. 6). Fig. 7 shows that for λ0 = 1, the resultant distri-
bution is P (m) ∼ m−(1+ν), ν = 1+ δ.
In case of uniformly distributed saving propensity λ
(ρ(λ) = 1, 0 ≤ λ < 1), the individual money distribution
Pλ(m) for agents with any particular λ value, although
differs considerably, remains non-monotonic (see Fig. 8),
similar to that for uniform λ market with mp(λ) shift-
ing with λ (see Fig. 3). Few subtle points may be noted
though: while for uniform λ the mp(λ) were all less than
of the order of unity (average money per agent is fixed to
M/N = 1; see Fig. 3), for distributed λ case mp(λ) can
be considerably larger and can approach to the order of
N for large λ (see Fig. 8). This in consistent with the em-
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Fig. 8. Steady state money distribution Pλ(m) for some
typical values of λ (= 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.85, 0.95) in the dis-
tributed λ model. The data is collected from the ensembles
with N = 200 agents. The total distribution of money P (m) is
also plotted for comparison. For all cases, the average money
per agent M/N = 1.
pirically known fact that the large-income people usually
have larger saving factors [53].
There is also a marked qualitative difference in fluctu-
ations: while for fixed λ, the fluctuations in time (around
the most-probable value) in the individuals’ money mi(t)
gradually decreases with increasing λ, for quenched distri-
bution of λ, the trend gets reversed.
We investigated on the range of distribution of the sav-
ing propensities in a certain interval a < λi < b, where,
0 < a < b < 1. For uniform distribution within the range,
we observe the appearance of the same power law in the
distribution but for a narrower region. As may be seen
from Fig. 9, as a → b, the power-law behavior is seen for
values a or b approaching more and more towards unity:
For the same width of the interval |b − a|, one obtains
power-law (with the same value of ν) when b → 1. This
indicates that for fixed λ, λ = 0 correspond to a Gibbs
distribution, and one observes a power law in P (m) when
λ has got a non-zero width of its distribution extending
upto λ = 1. It must be emphasized at this point that we
are talking about the limit λ → 1, since any agent hav-
ing λ = 1 will result in condensation of money with that
particular agent. The role of the agents with high saving
propensity (λ → 1) is crucial: the power law behavior is
truely valid upto the asymptotic limit if λ = 1 is included.
Indeed, had we assumed λ0 = 1 in Eqn. (17), the Pareto
exponent ν immediately switches over to ν = 1 + α. Of
course, λ0 6= 1 in Eqn. (17) leads to the universality of the
Pareto distribution with ν = 1 (irrespective of λ0 and α).
Obviously, P (m) ∼ ∫ 1
0
Pλ(m)ρ(λ)dλ ∼m−2 for ρ(λ) given
by Eqn. (17) and P (m) ∼ m−(2+α) if λ0 = 1 in Eqn. (17)
(for large m values).
Another numerical study [44] analysed the averagemoney
of the agent with the maximum savings factor 〈m(λmax)〉.
This study concludes on the time evolution of the money
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Fig. 9. Steady state money distribution in cases when the
saving propensity λ is distributed uniformly within a range of
values: (a) λ distribution extends upto 1, money distribution
shows power law both for lower cut-offs 0.5 and 0.9; (a) width
of λ distribution is 0.3, money distribution shows a power law
in a narrow region only for 0.6 < λ < 0.9. The power law
exponent is ν ≃ 1 in all cases. All data shown here are for
N = 100, M/N = 1.
of this agent, and finds a scaling behavior
[〈m(λmax)〉/N ] (1− λmax)0.725 ∼ G [t(1− λmax)] . (18)
This implies that the stationary state for the agent with
the maximum value of λ is reached after a relaxation time
τ ∝ (1 − λmax)−1. (19)
The average money 〈m(λmax)〉 of this agent is also found
to scale as
[〈m(λmax)〉/N ]N−0.15 ∼ F [(1− λmax)N1.5]. (20)
The scaling function F [x]→ x−κ as x→ 0 with κ ≈ 0.76.
This means 〈m(λmax)〉N−1.15 ∼ (1−λmax)−0.76N−1.14 or
〈m(λmax)〉 ∼ (1 − λmax)−0.76N0.01. Since for a society of
N traders (1− λmax) ∼ 1/N this implies
〈m(λmax)〉 ∼ N0.77. (21)
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These model income distributions P (m) compare very
well with the wealth distributions of various countries:
Data suggests Gibbs like distribution in the low-income
range (more than 90% of the population) and Pareto-like
in the high-income range [19,16,32] (less than 10% of the
population) of various countries. In fact, we compared one
model simulation of the market with saving propensity of
the agents distributed following Eqn. (17), with λ0 = 0
and δ = −0.7 [50]. The qualitative resemblance of the
model income distribution with the real data for Japan
and USA in recent years is quite intriguing. In fact, for
negative δ values in Eqn. (17), the density of traders with
low saving propensity is higher and since λ = 0 ensemble
yields Gibbs-like income distribution Eqn. (6), we see an
initial Gibbs-like distribution which crosses over to Pareto
distribution Eqn. (1) with ν = 1.0 for large m values. The
position of the crossover point depends on the value of
α. It is important to note that any distribution of λ near
λ = 1, of finite width, eventually gives Pareto law for large
m limit. The same kind of crossover behavior (from Gibbs
to Pareto) can also be reproduced in a model market of
mixed agents where λ = 0 for a finite fraction of popu-
lation and λ is distributed uniformly over a finite range
near λ = 1 for the rest of the population.
5 Analytical studies
There have been a number of attempts to study the uni-
form savings model (Model B, Sec. 3.2) analytically (see
e.g., [54]), but no closed form expression for the steady
state distribution P (m) has yet been arrived at. Kar Gupta [55]
investigated the nature of the transition matrices from the
equations Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (15) and concluded that the
effect of introducing a saving propensity leads to a non-
singular transition matrix, and hence a time irreversible
state.
We review now some of the investigations on the steady
state distribution P (m) of money resulting from the equa-
tions Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (15) representing the trading and
money dynamics (Model C, Sec. 3.3) in the distributed
savings case. The dynamics of money distribution is solved
in two limiting cases. In one case, the evolution of the mu-
tual money difference among the agents is investigated and
one looks for a self-consistent equation for its steady state
distribution. In the other case, a master equation for the
money distribution function is developed [56,57].
5.1 Distribution of money difference
Clearly in the process as considered (dynamics defined by
Eqns. (14) and (15)), the total money (mi+mj) of the pair
of agents i and j remains constant, while the difference
∆mij evolves as
(∆mij)t+1 ≡ (mi −mj)t+1 =
(
λi + λj
2
)
(∆mij)t
+
(
λi − λj
2
)
(mi +mj)t
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Fig. 10. Steady state money distribution P (m) against m in
a numerical simulation of a market with N = 200, following
equations Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (15) with ǫij = 1/2. The dotted
line corresponds to m−(1+ν); ν = 1. Here, the average money
per agent M/N = 1.
+(2ǫij − 1)[(1− λi)mi(t) + (1− λj)mj(t)].
(22)
Numerically, as shown in Fig. 4, we observe that the
steady state money distribution in the market becomes
a power law, following such tradings when the saving fac-
tor λi of the agents remain constant over time but varies
from agent to agent widely. As shown in the numerical
simulation results for P (m) in Fig. 10, the law, as well as
the exponent, remains unchanged even when ǫij = 1/2 for
every trading. This can be justified by the earlier numeri-
cal observation [40,50] for fixed λ market (λi = λ for all i)
that in the steady state, criticality occurs as λ→ 1 where
of course the dynamics becomes extremely slow. In other
words, after the steady state is realized, the third term
in Eqn. (22) becomes unimportant for the critical behav-
ior. For simplicity, we concentrate on this case, where the
above evolution equation for ∆mij can be written in a
more simplified form as
(∆mij)t+1 = λ¯ij(∆mij)t + λ˜ij(mi +mj)t, (23)
where λ¯ij =
1
2 (λi + λj) and λ˜ij =
1
2 (λi − λj). As such,
0 ≤ λ¯ < 1 and − 12 < λ˜ < 12 .
The steady state probability distribution D for the
modulus ∆ = |∆m| of the mutual money difference be-
tween any two agents in the market can be obtained from
Eqn. (23) in the following way provided ∆ is very much
larger than the average money per agent = M/N . This is
because, using Eqn. (23), large ∆ can appear at t+1, say,
from ‘scattering’ from any situation at t for which the right
hand side of Eqn. (23) is large. The possibilities are (at
t) mi large (rare) and mj not large, where the right hand
side of eqn. Eqn. (23) becomes ≃ (λ¯ij + λ˜ij)(∆ij)t; or mj
large (rare) and mi not large (making the right hand side
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of eqn. Eqn. (23) becomes ≃ (λ¯ij − λ˜ij)(∆ij)t); or when
mi and mj are both large, which is a much rarer situation
than the first two and hence is negligible. Consequently
for large ∆ the distribution D satisfies
D(∆) =
∫
d∆′ D(∆′)
×〈δ(∆− (λ¯ + λ˜)∆′) + δ(∆− (λ¯− λ˜)∆′)〉
= 2
〈(
1
λ
)
D
(
∆
λ
)〉
, (24)
where we have used the symmetry of the λ˜ distribution
and the relation λ¯ij+ λ˜ij = λi, and have suppressed labels
i, j. Here 〈. . .〉 denote average over λ distribution in the
market, and δ denotes the δ-function. Taking now a uni-
form random distribution of the saving factor λ, ρ(λ) = 1
for 0 ≤ λ < 1, and assuming D(∆) ∼ ∆−(1+ν) for large
∆, we get
1 = 2
∫ 1
0
dλ λν = 2(1 + ν)−1, (25)
giving ν = 1. No other value fits the above equation. This
also indicates that the money distribution P (m) in the
market also follows a similar power law variation, P (m) ∼
m−(1+ν) and ν = 1. Distribution of ∆ from numerical
simulations also agree with this result.
A detailed analysis of the master equation for the ki-
netic exchange process and its solution for a special case
can be seen in Ref. [56,57]. For a pioneering study of the
kinetic equations for the two-body scattering process and
a more general solution, see Ref. [45,46].
5.2 A mean field explanation
One can also derive the above results in a mean field limit,
where the money redistribution equations for the individ-
ual agents participating in a trading process can be re-
duced to a stochastic map in m2 [58]. The trick is to take
the product of Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (15) and look for the
time evolution of m2:
mi(t+ 1)mj(t+ 1) = αi(ǫt, λi)m
2
i (t) + αj(ǫt, λj)m
2
j(t)
+αij(ǫt, λi, λj)mi(t)mj(t). (26)
Since ǫij in eqns. (5), (10) and (16) keeps on changing
(with time t) with the pairs of scatterer (i, j), we use here
ǫt to denote its explicit time dependence. We now intro-
duce a mean-field-like approximation by replacing each of
the quadratic quantities m2i , m
2
j and mimj by a mean
quantity m2. Therefore Eqn. (26) is replaced by its mean-
field-like approximation
m2(t+ 1) = η(t)m2(t) (27)
where η(t) is an algebraic function of λi, λj and ǫt; it has
been observed in numerical simulations of the model that
the value of ǫt, whether it is random or constant, has no
effect on the steady state distribution [56] and the time
dependence of η(t) results from the different values of λi
and λj encountered during the evolution of the market.
Denoting log(m2) by x, Eqn. (27) can be written as
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + δ(t), (28)
where δ(t) = log η(t) is a random number that changes
with each time-step. The transformed map (Eqn. (28))
depicts a random walk and therefore the ‘displacements’
x in the time interval [0, t] follows the normal distribution
P(x) ∼ exp
(
−x
2
t
)
. (29)
Now
P(x)dx ≡ P (m)dm2 (30)
where P (m) is the log-normal distribution of m2:
P (m) ∼ 1
m2
exp
[
−
(
log(m2)
)2
t
]
. (31)
The normal distribution in Eqn. (29) spreads with time
(since its width is proportional to
√
t) and so does the
normal factor in Eqn. (31) which eventually becomes a
very weak function of m and may be assumed to be a
constant as t→∞. Consequently P (m) assumes the form
of a simple power law:
P (m) ∼ 1
m2
for t→∞, (32)
that is clearly the Pareto law for the model. Hence, the
power law behavior obtained here agrees with the simula-
tion results.
5.3 Average money at any saving propensity and the
distribution
Several numerical studies investigated [59,60] the saving
factor λ and the average money held by an agent whose
savings factor is λ. This numerical study revealed that the
product of this average money and the unsaved fraction
remains constant, or in other words, the quantity
〈m(λ)〉(1 − λ) = c (33)
where c is a constant. This key result has been justified
using a rigorous analysis by Mohanty [61]. We give below
a simpler argument and proceed to derive the steady state
distribution P (m) in its general form.
In a mean field approach, one can calculate [61] the dis-
tribution for the ensemble average of money for the model
with distributed savings. It is assumed that the distribu-
tion of money of a single agent over time is stationary,
which means that the time averaged value of money of
any agent remains unchanged independent of the initial
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value of money. Taking the ensemble average of all terms
on both sides of Eqn. (14), one can write
〈mi〉 = λi〈mi〉+〈ǫ〉

(1− λi)〈mi〉+ 〈 1
N
N∑
j=1
(1− λj)mj〉

 .
(34)
It is assumed that any agent on the average, interacts
with all others in the system. The last term on the right
is replaced by the average over the agents. Writing
〈(1 − λ)m〉 ≡
〈
1
N
N∑
j=1
(1 − λj)mj
〉
(35)
and since ǫ is assumed to be distributed randomly and
uniformly in [0, 1], so that 〈ǫ〉 = 1/2, Eqn. (34) reduces to
(1− λi)〈mi〉 = 〈(1 − λ)m〉.
Since the right side is free of any agent index, it sug-
gests that this relation is true for any arbitrary agent,
i.e., 〈mi〉(1−λi) = constant, where λi is the saving factor
of the ith agent (as in Eqn. (33)) and what follows is:
dλ ∝ dm
m2
. (36)
An agent with a particular saving propensity factor λ
therefore ends up with a characteristic average wealth m
given by Eqn. (33) such that one can in general relate the
distributions of the two:
P (m) dm = ρ(λ) dλ. (37)
This, together with Eqn. (33) and Eqn. (34) gives [61]
P (m) = ρ(λ)
dλ
dm
∝ ρ(1−
c
m
)
m2
, (38)
giving P (m) ∼ m−2 for large m for uniform distribution
of savings factor λ, i.e, ν = 1; and ν = 1 + δ for ρ(λ) =
(1 − λ)δ. This study therefore explains the origin of the
universal (ν = 1) as well as the non-universal (ν = 1 + δ)
Pareto exponent values in the distributed savings model,
as discussed in Sec. 4 and shown in Fig 6 and Fig. 7.
6 Other model studies
Sinha [62,63] considered an iterative map approach to
distribution of wealth in an economy, along with models
that employed yard-sale (YS) as well as theft and fraud
(TF) [25] for asset exchange, yielding interesting results.
A recent study [64] also considers combinations of these
strategies, along with partial savings in a class of models.
Recent detailed studies [65] of empirical data and analysis
of the distribution functions present a strong case in favor
of gas-like models for economic exchanges. Other studies
calculated the holding time [66] of money, which indicated
in turn the mobility of the money in a model under a given
dynamics. Another similar study [67] calculated the veloc-
ity of money in a life-cycle model. Studies of gas-like or
particle-exchange models have already been carried out
on complex networks [68,69]. Similar models study the ef-
fect of risk aversion and subsequent emergence of Gibbs
and power-law distributions in different cases [70], while
another study tunes the rate of money transfer to ob-
tain Boltzmann and Gibbs-like money distributions [71].
Similarly, one can introduce asymmetry in favor of either
of the traders in a trade-investment framework and pro-
duce power law distributions in wealth distributions [72].
Preferential spending behavior can also lead to similar re-
sults [73]. Recently, Angle [74] has also proposed a macro-
model for the inequality process to explain the upward
surge of the Pareto tail in recent time for the US waged
income data. Du¨ring and Toscani [75] recently formulated
hydrodynamic equations for such kinetic models of mar-
kets.
There are evidences of emerging income inequality aris-
ing as a consequence of resource flow in hierarchical or-
ganizations [76], and the resulting income distribution is
power law distributed.
6.1 A model with ‘annealed’ savings
In a real trading process, the concept of ‘saving factor’
cannot be attributed to a quantity that is invariant with
time. A saving factor always changes with time or trading.
In some of the earlier works [50], we reported the case
of annealed savings, where the savings factor λi changes
with time in the interval [0, 1), but does not give rise to a
power law in P (m) [50]. But, there are some special cases
of annealed saving can give rise to a power law distribution
of P (m).
We proposed [77] a slightly different model of an an-
nealed saving case. Let us associate a parameter µi (0 <
µi < 1) with each agent i such that the savings factor λi
randomly assumes a value in the interval [µi, 1) at each
time or trading. The trading rules are of course unal-
tered and governed by Eqns. (14) and (15). Now, consid-
ering a suitable distribution ζ(µ) of µ over the agents, one
can produce money distributions with power-law tail. The
only condition that needs to be satisfied is that ζ(µ) should
be non-vanishing as µ→ 1. Figure 11 shows the case when
ζ(µ) = 1. Numerical simulations suggest that the behav-
ior of the wealth distribution is similar to the quenched
savings case. In other words, only if ζ(µ) ∝ |1 − µ|δ, it is
reflected in the Pareto exponent as ν = 1+ δ [77]. µi is in-
terpreted as the lower bound of the saving distribution of
the i-th agent. Thus, while agents are allowed to randomly
save any fraction of their money, the bound ensures that
there is always a non-vanishing fraction of the population
that assumes high saving fraction.
6.2 A model with a non-consumable commodity
Money is certainly not the only quantity that circulates in
a trading market. Exchange of goods is the main entity for
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Fig. 11. Distribution P (m) of money m in case of annealed
savings λ varying randomly in [µ, 1). Here, ζ(µ) has a uniform
distribution. The distribution produces a power law tail with
Pareto exponent ν = 1. The simulation has been done for
a system of N = 100 agents, with average money per agent
M/N = 1. P (m) is the steady state distribution after 4× 104
Monte Carlo steps, and the data is averaged over an ensemble
of 105.
transactions. Different economic conditions give rise to the
fluctuation of price of these commodities and this plays an
important role in the behavior of the market as a whole.
The determination of ‘price’ is a complex phenomena and
is decided by the dynamics of supply and demand of the
particular commodity.
In the trading markets discussed in previous two chap-
ters, modifications due to exchange of a consumable com-
modity hardy affects the distribution, as the commodity
once bought or sold need not be accounted for. Consum-
able commodities effectively have no ‘price’, as due to their
short lifetime to contribute to the total wealth of an in-
dividual. It is interesting however, to study the role of
non-consumable commodities in such market models.
For sake of simplicity, we consider a simplified version
of a market with a single non-consumable commodity [78].
As before, we consider a fixed number of traders or agents
N who trade in a market with total money
∑
imi(t) =M
and total commodity
∑
i ci(t) = C, mi(t) and ci(t) being
the money and commodity respectively of the i-th agent
at time t and are both non-negative. Needless to men-
tion, both mi(t) and ci(t) change with time or trading
t. The market, as in previous cases, is closed, i.e., N , M
and C are constants. The wealth wi of an individual i
in that case is, the sum of the money and commodity it
possesses, i.e., wi = mi + p0ci; where p0 is the “global”
price. In course of trading, total money and total commod-
ity are locally conserved, and this automatically conserves
the total wealth. In such a market, one can define a global
average price parameter p0 = M/C, which is set to unity
in this case, giving wi = mi + ci. It may be noted at this
point that in order to avoid the complication of restrict-
ing the commodity-money exchange and their reversal be-
tween the same agents, the Fisher velocity of money cir-
culation (see e.g., Ref. [79]) is renormalised to unity here.
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Fig. 12. Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in a
market with no savings (saving factor λ = 0) for no price
fluctuations i.e, θ = 0. The graphs show simulation results for
a system of N = 100 agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1; mi = ci = 1
at t = 0 for all agents i. The inset shows the distribution P (w)
of total wealth w = m+c. As p = 1, for θ = 0, although m and
c can change with tradings within the limit (0− 2) the sum is
always maintained at 2.
In order to accommodate the lack of proper information
and the ability of the agents to bargain etc., we will allow
fluctuations θ in the price of the commodities at any trad-
ing (time): p(t) = p0 ± θ = 1 ± θ. We find, the nature of
steady state to be unchanged and independent of θ, once
it becomes non-vanishing.
In general, the dynamics of money in this market looks
the same as Eqns. (3), (5), (8), (9), (10) or (14), (15), (16)
depending on whether λi = 0 for all, λi 6= 0 but uniform
for all i or λi 6= λj respectively. However, all ∆m are not
allowed here; only those, for which∆mi ≡ mi(t+1)−mi(t)
or ∆mj are allowed by the corresponding changes ∆ci
or ∆cj in their respective commodities (∆m > 0, ∆c >
0) [78]:
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t) +
mi(t+ 1)−mi(t)
p(t)
(39)
cj(t+ 1) = cj(t)− mj(t+ 1)−mj(t)
p(t)
(40)
where p(t) is the local-time ‘price’ parameter, a stochastic
variable:
p(t) =
{
1 + θ with probability 0.5
1− θ with probability 0.5 . (41)
The role of the stochasticity in p(t) is to imitate the ef-
fect of bargaining in a trading process. θ parametrizes the
amount of stochasticity. The role of θ is significant in the
sense that it determines the (relaxation) time the whole
system takes to reach a dynamically equilibrium state; the
system reaches equilibrium sooner for larger θ, while its
magnitude does not affect the steady state distribution. It
may be noted that, in course of trading process, certain
exchanges are not allowed (e.g., in cases when a particular
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Fig. 13. Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in the
uniform savings commodity market for different values of sav-
ing factor λ (0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 from left to
right near the origin) for θ = 0.05. The inset shows the distri-
bution P (c) of commodity c in the uniform savings commodity
market for different values of saving factor λ. The graphs show
simulation results for a system of N = 100 agents, M/N = 1,
C/N = 1.
pair of traders do not have enough commodity to exchange
in favor of an agreed exchange of money). We then skip
these steps and choose a new pair of agents for trading.
In an ideal gas market without savings, money is ex-
ponentially distributed in presence of any finite value of θ.
Again, commodity has a small initial peak before decaying
exponentially. However, the total wealth w = m+ c has a
form of a Gamma distribution.
For θ = 0, however, wealth of each agent remains in-
variant with time as only the proportion of money and
commodity interchange within themselves, as the ‘price’
factor remains constant. This of course happens irrespec-
tive of the savings factor being zero, uniform or distributed.
For θ = 0, the steady state distribution of money or com-
modity can take non-trivial forms: see Fig. 12, but strictly
a δ-function for total wealth, or at the value of wealth one
starts with (see inset of Fig. 12 for the case mi = ci = 1
for all i) [78].
As mentioned already for θ 6= 0, the steady state re-
sults are not dependent on the value of θ, the relaxation
time of course decreases with increasing θ. In such a mar-
ket with uniform savings, money distribution P (m) has
a form similar to a set (for λ 6= 0) of Gamma functions
(see Fig. 13): a set of curves with a most-probable value
shifting from 0 to 1 as saving factor λ changes from 0 to 1
(as in the case without commodity). The commodity dis-
tribution P (c) has an initial peak and an exponential fall-
off, without much systematics with varying λ (see inset of
Fig. 13). The distribution P (w) of total wealth w = m+ c
behaves much like P (m) (see Fig. 14). It is to be noted that
since there is no precise correspondence with commodity
and money for θ 6= 0 (unlike when θ = 0, when the sum
is fixed), P (w) cannot be derived directly from P (m) and
P (c). However, there are further interesting features. Al-
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Fig. 14. Steady state distribution P (w) of total wealth w =
m + c in the uniform savings commodity market for different
values of saving factor λ (0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
from left to right) for θ = 0.05. The graphs show simulation
results for a system of N = 100 agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
though they form a class of Gamma distributions, the set
of curves for different values of saving factor λ seem to
intersect at a common point, near w = 1. All the reported
data are for a system of N = 100 agents, with M/N = 1
and C/N = 1 and for a case where the noise θ equals
0.5 [78].
For λ distributed uniformly within the interval 0 ≤
λ < 1, the tails of both money and wealth distributions
P (m) and P (w) have Pareto law behavior with a fitting
exponent value ν = 1 ± 0.02 and ν = 1 ± 0.05 respec-
tively (see Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 respectively), whereas the
commodity distribution is still exponentially decaying (see
inset of Fig. 15) [78].
A major limitation of these money-only exchange mod-
els considered earlier [3,38,37,39,40,25,50,51,52,80,81,82,83,47,48,49,43,45,46,61,56,77]
is that they do not make any explicit reference to the com-
modities exchanged with the money and to the constraints
they impose on the exchange process. Also, the wealth is
not just the money is possession (unless the commodity ex-
changed with the money is strictly consumable). Here, we
have studied the effect of a single non-consumable com-
modity on the money (and also wealth) distributions in
the steady state, and allowing for local (in time) price fluc-
tuation. Allowing for price fluctuation is very crucial for
the model – it allows for the stochastic dynamics to play
its proper role in the market. However, this model is quite
different from that considered recently in Ref. [84], where
p0 is strictly unity and the stochasticity enters from other
exogenous factors. In the sense that we also consider two
exchangeable variables in the market, our model has some
similarity with that in Ref [85]. However, Silver et al [85]
consider only random exchanges between agents (keeping
the total conserved) while we consider random exchanges
and also allowing for price fluctuations and savings. As
such they only obtain the Gamma distribution in wealth,
while our model produce both Gamma and Pareto distri-
butions. In spite of many significant effects, the general
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Fig. 15. Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in the
commodity market with distributed savings 0 ≤ λ < 1. P (m)
has a power-law tail with Pareto exponent ν = 1±0.02 (a power
law function x−2 is given for comparison). The inset shows
the distribution P (c) of commodity c in the same commodity
market. The graphs show simulation results for a system of
N = 1000 agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
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Fig. 16. Steady state distribution P (w) of total wealth w =
m + c in the commodity market with distributed savings 0 ≤
λ < 1. P (w) has a power-law tail with Pareto exponent ν =
1±0.05 (a power law function x−2 is given for comparison). The
inset shows the cumulative distribution Q(w) ≡
∫
∞
w
P (w)dw.
The graphs show simulation results for a system of N = 1000
agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
feature of Gamma-like form of the money (and wealth)
distributions (for uniform λ) and the power law tails for
both money and wealth (for distributed λ) with identi-
cal exponents, are seen to remain unchanged. The precise
studies (theories) for the money-only exchange models are
therefore extremely useful and relevant.
7 Discussions
Empirical data for income and wealth distribution in many
countries are now available, and they reflect a particular
robust pattern (see Fig. 1). The bulk (about 90%) of the
distribution resemble the century-old Gibbs distribution
of energy for an ideal gas, while there are evidences of
considerable deviation in the low income as well as high
income ranges. The high income range data (for 5-10% of
the population in any country) fits to a power law tail,
known after Pareto, and the value of the (power law) ex-
ponent ranges between 1-3 and depends on the individual
make-up of the economy of the society or country. There
are also some reports of two distinct power law tails of
such distributions (see e.g. [86]).
The analogy with a gas like many-body system has
led to the formulation of the models of markets. The ran-
dom scattering-like dynamics of money (and wealth) in a
closed trading market, in analogy with energy conserved
exchange models, reveals interesting features. The mini-
mum modification required over such ideal gas-like kinetic
exchange models seem to be the consideration of saving
propensity of the traders. Self-organisation is a key emerg-
ing feature of these kinetic exchange models when saving
factors are introduced. In the model with uniform sav-
ings (see Sec. 3.2), the Gamma-like distribution of wealth
shows stable most-probable or peaked distribution with a
most-probable value indicative of an economic scale de-
pendent on the saving propensity or factor λ. Empirical
observations in homogeneous groups of individuals as in
waged income of factory labourers in UK and USA [7]
and data from population survey in USA among students
of different school and colleges produce similar distribu-
tions [49]. This is a relatively simpler case where a homo-
geneous population (say, characterised by a unique value
of λ) could be identified.
In the model with distributed savings (see Sec. 3.3), the
saving propensity is assumed to have a randomness and
varies from agent to agent. One finds the emergence of a
power law tail in money (and wealth) in cases where the
saving factor is a quenched variable (does not change with
tradings or time t) within different agents or traders. Sev-
eral variants have been investigated for the basic model,
including an ‘annealed’ version, some of which produce
the Pareto-like power law (Eqn. (1)). The money exchange
equations can be cast into a master equation, and the so-
lution to the steady state money distribution giving the
Pareto law with ν = 1 have been derived using several
approaches (see Sec. 5). The results of the mean field the-
ory agree with the simulations. We have mostly used the
terms ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ interchangably, treating the
models in terms of only one quantity, namely ‘money’
that is exchanged. Ofcourse, wealth does not comprise
of (paper) money only, and there have been studies dis-
tinguishing these two. We review one such model study
in Sec. 6.2 where, in addition to money, a single non-
consumable commodity, having local price fluctuations,
was introduced. The steady state money and wealth (com-
prising of money and price weighted commodity) distribu-
tions were then investigated in the same market. Interest-
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ingly, the scaling behavior for high range of the money as
well as the wealth are found to be similar (see Sec. 6.2),
with identical Pareto exponent value for the distributed
savings.
Study of such simple models here give some insight
into the possible emergence of self organizations in such
markets, evolution of the steady state distribution, emer-
gence of Gamma-like distribution for the bulk and of the
power law tail, as in the empirically observed distributions
(Fig. 1). A study of these models in terms of quantities
that parametrise the circulation of money [79] suggests
that the model with distributed savings perform better.
These studies bring some new insight into the some essen-
tial economic issues, including economic mobility.
These model studies also indicate the appearance of
self-organization, and the self-orgaized criticality [87] in
particular, in the simplest model so far; namely in the ki-
netic gas models, when the effect of random saving propen-
sities [24] is incorporated. Our observations indicate that
the Gibbs and the (self-organized critical) Pareto distribu-
tions fall in the same category and can appear naturally in
the century-old and well-established kinetic theory of gas
[88,89]: Gibbs distribution for no saving and Pareto distri-
bution for agents with quenched random saving propen-
sity. To some degree of approximation therefore, these
studies indicate that the society or market behaves like
an ideal gas, and the exchange of money and wealth looks
similar as in the above models at a coarse-grained level.
Statistical physics allows us to model and analyse such
systems in analogy to a variety of many body systems
studied traditionally within the framework of physics; see
e.g., Yakovenko [90] for an alternative account on these
developments.
These models have additional prospective future ap-
plications in other spheres of social as well as physical
sciences. In social sciences, the knowledge of the mecha-
nism by which such distributions of wealth emerge out of
collective exchanges may find application in policy making
and taxation [26]. In physical sciences, the corresponding
particle exchange model can find important application
in designing desired energy spectrum for different types of
chemical reactions [91].
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